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Abstract
The fading broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCC) is investigated,
where a source node has common information for two receivers (receivers 1 and 2), and
has confidential information intended only for receiver 1. The confidential information
needs to be kept as secret as possible from receiver 2. The broadcast channel from the
source node to receivers 1 and 2 is corrupted by multiplicative fading gain coefficients
in addition to additive Gaussian noise terms. The channel state information (CSI) is
assumed to be known at both the transmitter and the receivers. The parallel BCC
with independent subchannels is first studied, which serves as an information-theoretic
model for the fading BCC. The secrecy capacity region of the parallel BCC is estab-
lished. This result is then specialized to give the secrecy capacity region of the parallel
BCC with degraded subchannels. The secrecy capacity region is then established for
the parallel Gaussian BCC, and the optimal source power allocations that achieve the
boundary of the secrecy capacity region are derived. In particular, the secrecy capacity
region is established for the basic Gaussian BCC. The secrecy capacity results are then
applied to study the fading BCC. The ergodic performance is first studied. The ergodic
secrecy capacity region and the optimal power allocations that achieve the boundary
of this region are derived. The outage performance is then studied, where a long term
power constraint is assumed. The power allocation is derived that minimizes the out-
age probability where either the target rate of the common message or the target rate
of the confidential message is not achieved. The power allocation is also derive that
minimizes the outage probability where the target rate of the confidential message is
not achieved subject to the constraint that the target rate of the common message
must be achieved for all channel states.
1The material in this paper was presented in part at the 44th Annual Allerton Conference on Communi-
cation, Control, and Computing, Monticello, IL, Sept. 2006.
2The research was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant ANI-03-38807 and by
National Science Foundation.
3Yingbin Liang and H. Vincent Poor are with the Department of Electrical Engineer-
ing, Princeton University, Engineering Quadrangle, Olden Street, Princeton, NJ 08544; e-mail:
{yingbinl,poor}@princeton.edu; Shlomo Shamai (Shitz) is with the Department of Electrical
Engineering, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Technion City, Haifa 32000, Israel; email:
sshlomo@ee.technion.ac.il
1
1 Introduction
Wireless communication has a broadcast nature, where security issues are captured by a basic
wire-tap channel introduced by Wyner in [1]. In this model, a source node wishes to transmit
confidential information to a destination node and wishes to keep a wire-tapper as ignorant
of this information as possible. The performance measure of interest is the secrecy capacity,
which is the largest reliable communication rate from the source node to the destination
node with the wire-tapper obtaining no information. The secrecy capacity was given in [1]
for the discrete memoryless wire-tap channel and in [2] for the Gaussian wire-tap channel.
The wire-tap channel was considered recently for the fading and multiple antenna channels
in [3, 4]. A more general model of the wire-tap channel was studied by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner
in [5], where the source node also has a common message for both receivers in addition to the
confidential message for only one receiver. This channel is regarded as the broadcast channel
with confidential messages (BCC). The capacity-equivocation region and the secrecy capacity
region of the BCC were characterized in [5]. The BCC was further studied recently in [6],
where the source node transmits two confidential message sets for two receivers, respectively,
in addition to the common message for both receivers.
In this paper, we investigate the fading BCC, which is based on the BCC studied in [5]
with the channels from the source node to receivers 1 and 2 corrupted by multiplicative
fading gain coefficients in addition to additive Gaussian noise terms. The fading BCC model
captures the basic time-varying property of wireless channels, and hence understanding this
channel plays an important role in solving security issues in wireless applications. For the
fading BCC, we assume that the fading gain coefficients are stationary and ergodic over
time. We further assume that the channel state information (CSI) is known at both the
transmitter and the receivers. The CSI at the source node can be realized by a reliable
feedback from the two receivers, who are supposed to receive information from the source
node.
The fading BCC we study in this paper relates to or generalizes a few channels that have
been previously studied in the literature. Compared to the fading broadcast channel that
was studied in [7–11], the fading BCC requires an additional secrecy constraint that the
confidential information for one receiver must be perfectly secret from the other receiver.
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Compared to the fading wire-tap channel studied in [12] (the conference version of this
paper), [13] and [14] (full CSI case), the fading BCC we study in this paper assumes that the
source node has a common message for both receivers in addition to the confidential message
for receiver 1. Hence the fading BCC includes the fading wire-tap channel as a special case.
The fading BCC also includes the parallel Gaussian wire-tap channel studied in [15] (the
case where wire-tappers cooperate) as a special case for the same reason as above and also
because a power constraint is assumed for each subchannel in [15].
Before studying the fading BCC, we first study a more general model of the parallel BCC
with L independent subchannels, where the source node communicates with receivers 1 and
2 over L parallel links. This model serves as a general information-theoretic model that
includes the fading BCC as a special case. We establish the secrecy capacity region of the
parallel BCC. In particular, we provide a converse proof to show that independent input
distribution for each subchannel is optimal to achieve the secrecy capacity region. This fact
does not follow directly from the single letter characterization of the secrecy capacity region
of the BCC given in [5]. The secrecy capacity region of the parallel BCC further gives the
secrecy capacity region of the parallel BCC with degraded subchannels.
We further study the parallel Gaussian BCC, which is an example parallel BCC with
degraded subchannels. We show that the secrecy capacity region of the parallel Gaussian
BCC is a union over the rate regions achieved by all source power allocations (among the
parallel subchannels). Moreover, we derive the optimal power allocations that achieve the
boundary of the secrecy capacity region and hence completely characterize this region. The
secrecy capacity region of the parallel Gaussian BCC also establishes the secrecy capacity
region for the basic Gaussian BCC. This result complements the secrecy capacity region of
the discrete memoryless BCC given by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner in [5].
We then apply our results to investigate the fading BCC. We first study the ergodic per-
formance, where no delay constraints on message transmission are assumed and the secrecy
capacity region is averaged over all channel states. Now the fading BCC can be viewed as
the parallel Gaussian BCC with each fading state corresponding to one subchannel. Thus,
the secrecy capacity region of the parallel Gaussian BCC applies to the fading BCC. In
particular, since the source node knows the CSI, it can dynamically change its transmission
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power with channel state realization to achieve the best performance. We obtain the optimal
power allocations that achieve the boundary of the secrecy capacity region for the fading
BCC.
We further study the outage performance of the fading BCC, where messages must be
transmitted over a certain time (one block) to satisfy the delay constraint. We adopts the
block fading model, where the fading coefficients remain constant over one block and change
to another realization in the next block. The block length is assumed to be large enough to
guarantee decoding in one block. We assume the power constraint at the source node applies
over many blocks (i.e., it is a long term power constraint as in [16]). As in the analysis of
the ergodic performance, we assume that the CSI is known both at the transmitter and at
the receivers, and hence the source node can allocate its transmission power to achieve the
best outage performance. We first obtain the power allocation that minimizes the outage
probability where either the target rate of the common message or the target rate of the
confidential message is not achieved. We then obtain the power allocation that minimizes
the outage probability where the target rate of the confidential message is not achieved
subject to the constraint that the target rate of the common message must be achieved for
all channel states.
In this paper, we use X[1,L] to indicate a group of variables (X1, X2, . . . , XL), and use X
n
[1,L]
to indicate a group of vectors (Xn1 , X
n
2 , . . . , X
n
L), whereX
n
l indicates the vector (Xl1, Xl2, . . . , Xln).
Throughout the paper, the logarithmic function is to the base 2.
The paper is organized as follows. We first study the parallel BCC with independent
subchannels, and its special case of the parallel BCC with degraded subchannels. We next
study the parallel Gaussian BCC. We then study the ergodic and outage performances of the
fading BCC and demonstrate our results with numerical examples. We conclude the paper
with a few remarks.
We note that the wire-tap channel has also been studied in the work [17–27] and references
therein. The topic of common randomness and secret key capacity in communication systems
has been studied in [28–30]. Such communication system may be viewed as a wire-tap
channel with side information (which might be common randomness, i.e., a key at a certain
rate). Other related work on this topic can be found in [31–39] and references therein. We
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also remark that the secrecy rate/capacity has also been studied for the multiple access
channel [40–43] the relay channel in [44], and the interference channel in [6].
2 Parallel BCCs
2.1 Channel Model
We consider the parallel BCC with L independent subchannels (see Fig. 1), where there are
one source node and two receivers. Each subchannel is assumed to be a general broadcast
channel from the source node to the two receivers. As in the BCC, the source node wants
to transmit common information to both receivers and confidential information to receiver
1. Moreover, the source node wishes to keep the confidential information to be as secret as
possible from receiver 2.
More formally, the parallel BCC consists of L finite input alphabets X[1,L], and 2L finite
output alphabets Y[1,L] and Z[1,L]. The transition probability distribution is given by
p(y[1,L], z[1,L]|x[1,L]) =
L∏
l=1
pl(yl, zl|xl) (1)
where xl ∈ Xl, yl ∈ Yl, and zl ∈ Zl for l = 1, . . . , L.
If the parallel BCC has only one subchannel, i.e., L = 1, this channel becomes the BCC
studied in [5]. Moreover, each subchannel is assumed to be a general broadcast channel as
in [5] and is not necessarily degraded as assumed in [1].
A
(
2nR0 , 2nR1, n
)
code consists of the following:
• Two message sets: W0 = {1, 2, . . . , 2nR0} and W1 = {1, 2, . . . , 2nR0} with the
messagesW0 andW1 uniformly distributed over the setsW0 andW1, respectively;
• One (stochastic) encoder at the source node that maps each message pair (w0, w1) ∈
(W0,W1) to a codeword xn[1,L];
• Two decoders: one at receiver 1 that maps a received sequence yn[1,L] to a message
pair (wˆ
(1)
0 , wˆ1) ∈ (W0,W1); the other at receiver 2 that maps a received sequence
zn[1,L] to a message wˆ
(2)
0 ∈ W0.
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Figure 1: Parallel BCC
The secrecy level of the confidential message W1 achieved at receiver 2 is measured by the
equivocation rate defined as follows:
1
n
H
(
W1
∣∣∣Zn[1,L]) . (2)
The higher the equivocation rate, the less information that receiver 2 obtains about the
confidential message W1.
The probability of error when the message pair (w0, w1) is sent is defined as
Pe(w0, w1) = Pr
{
(wˆ
(1)
0 , wˆ1) 6= (w0, w1) or wˆ
(2)
0 6= w0
}
(3)
and the average probability of error is
Pe =
1
2nR02nR1
2nR0∑
w0=1
2nR1∑
w1=1
Pe(w0, w1). (4)
A rate-equivocation triple (R0, R1, Re) is achievable if there exists a sequence of
(
2nR0, 2nR1, n
)
codes with the average probability of error Pe → 0 as n goes to infinity and with the equiv-
ocation rate Re satisfying
Re ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
H
(
W1
∣∣∣Zn[1,L]) . (5)
In this paper, we focus on the case in which perfect secrecy is achieved, i.e., receiver 2 does
not obtain any information about the message W1. This happens if Re = R1. The secrecy
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capacity region Cs is defined to be the set that includes all (R0, R1) such that (R0, R1, Re =
R1) is achievable, i.e.,
Cs =
{
(R0, R1) : (R0, R1, Re = R1) is achievable
}
. (6)
2.2 Secrecy Capacity Region of Parallel BCCs
For the parallel BCC, we obtain the following secrecy capacity region.
Theorem 1. The secrecy capacity region of the parallel BCC is given by
Cs =
⋃
∏
l
[
p(ql)p(ul|ql)p(xl|ul)p(yl, zl|xl)
]


(R0, R1) :
R0 ≤ min
{
L∑
l=1
I(Ql;Yl) ,
L∑
l=1
I(Ql;Zl)
}
R1 ≤
L∑
l=1
[
I(Ul;Yl|Ql)− I(Ul;Zl|Ql)
]


(7)
where Ql can be chosen as a deterministic function of Ul for l = 1, . . . , L.
If the source node transmits only confidential information to receiver 1, i.e., R0 = 0, the
parallel BCC becomes the parallel wire-tap channel. The secrecy capacity of this channel
follows from Theorem 1 by noticing that I(Ul;Yl|Ql)−I(Ul;Zl|Ql) is maximized by a constant
Ql.
Corollary 1. The secrecy capacity of the parallel wire-tap channel is
Cs =
L∑
l=1
C(l)s (8)
where C ls is the secrecy capacity of subchannel l and is given by
C(l)s = max
[
I(Ul;Yl)− I(Ul;Zl)
]
(9)
The maximum in the preceding equation is over the distributions p(ul, xl)p(yl, zl|xl), which
satisfies the Markov chain condition Ul → Xl → (Yl, Zl).
Remark 1. Theorem 1 shows an important fact that independent input distribution for each
subchannel is optimal. This fact does not follow directly from the single letter result on the
secrecy capacity of the BCC given in [5], although the parallel BCC can be viewed as a special
case of the BCC. Hence a converse proof is needed, which is provided in Appendix A.
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We note that the secrecy capacity region C(l)s of subchannel l is given in [5, Corollary 1],
i.e. ,
C(l)s =
⋃
p(ql)p(ul|ql)p(xl|ul)p(yl, zl|xl)


(R0, R1) :
R0 ≤ min {I(Ql;Yl) , I(Ql;Zl)}
R1 ≤ I(Ul;Yl|Ql)− I(Ul;Zl|Ql)

 . (10)
We now define the sum of the secrecy capacity regions of the subchannels to be
Csum :=


(R0, R1) :
R0 =
∑
lRl0, R1 =
∑
lRl1,
with (Rl0, Rl1) ∈ C
(l)
s for l = 1, . . . , L.

 (11)
If we compare Cs with Csum, we make the following remark.
Remark 2. The secrecy capacity region Cs in Theorem 1 may be larger than the sum Csum
of the secrecy capacity regions of the subchannels. Hence the secrecy capacity region of the
parallel BCC is achieved by coding over all parallel subchannels.
This observation was also made in [45] for the broadcast channel with common messages.
This fact follows because the common rate has the following property
R0 = min
{
L∑
l=1
I(Ql;Yl) ,
L∑
l=1
I(Ql;Zl)
}
≥
L∑
l=1
min {I(Ql;Yl) , I(Ql;Zl)} =
L∑
l=1
Rl0
(12)
It can also be seen from the following simple example. For simplicity, we consider the case
in which the source node has only the common message for both receivers. We further
assume L = 2, and each subchannel is a deterministic broadcast channel for l = 1, 2 (see
Fig. 2). For subchannel 1, the link capacities to receivers 1 and 2 are C11 = 3 and C12 = 4,
respectively. For subchannel 2, the link capacities to receivers 1 and 2 are C21 = 7 and
C22 = 5, respectively. The capacity of this parallel channel is given by
C = min{C11 + C21, C12 + C22} = min{3 + 7, 4 + 5} = 9. (13)
However, the sum of the capacities of the two subchannels is
2∑
l=1
min{Cl1, Cl2} = min{3, 4}+min{7, 5} = 8 (14)
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Figure 2: A parallel BCC example
which is clearly smaller than the capacity given in (13).
Similar to Theorem 14.6.1 in [46], we obtain the following lemma for the BCC studied
in [5], which also applies to the parallel BCC we study in this paper.
Lemma 1. The secrecy capacity region of the BCC studied in [5] depends only on the
marginal transition probability distributions p(y|x) of the channel from the source node to
receiver 1 and p(z|x) of the channel from the source node to receiver 2.
Proof. The proof follows from the reasoning in [46, p. 454, Prob. 10] and the fact that the
equivocation rate 1
n
H
(
W1
∣∣∣Zn[1,L]) depends only on the marginal distribution of p(z|x).
One application of Lemma 1 is to obtain the following generalization of the result in [2]
for the Gaussian wire-tap channel, which is a special case of the BCC.
Corollary 2. The secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wire-tap channel given in [2, Theorem 1]
holds for the case, where the noise variables at the destination node and the wire-tapper have
a general correlation structure.
Lemma 1 will be useful in establishing the secrecy capacity region of the parallel Gaussian
BCC in Section 3.
2.3 Parallel BCCs with Degraded Subchannels
In the following, we study a special class of parallel BCCs, which specializes to the parallel
Gaussian BCC that is considered in Section 3, and is hence of particular interest.
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Figure 3: Parallel BCC with degraded subchannels
We consider the parallel BCC with degraded subchannels (see Fig. 3), where each sub-
channel is either degraded such that the output at receiver 2 is a degraded version of the
output at receiver 1, or degraded such that the output at receiver 1 is a degraded version of
the output at receiver 2. Note that although each subchannel is degraded, the entire channel
may not be degraded because the subchannels may not be degraded in the same fashion.
We define A to be the index set that includes all indices of subchannels, where the output
at receiver 2 is a degraded version of the output at receiver 1, i.e.,
pl(yl, zl|xl) = pl(yl|xl)pl(zl|yl) for l ∈ A. (15)
Hence the Markov chain condition Xl → Yl → Zl is satisfied for l ∈ A. We define Ac to be
the complement of the set A, and Ac includes all indices of subchannels, where the output
at receiver 1 is a degraded version of the output at receiver 2, i.e.,
pl(yl, zl|xl) = pl(zl|xl)pl(yl|zl) for l ∈ A
c. (16)
Hence the Markov chain condition Xl → Zl → Yl is satisfied for l ∈ Ac. The channel
transition probability distribution is given by
p(y[1,L], z[1,L]|x[1,L]) =
∏
l∈A
[
pl(yl|xl)pl(zl|yl)
] ∏
l∈Ac
[
pl(zl|xl)pl(yl|zl)
]
. (17)
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For the parallel BCC with degraded subchannels, we apply Theorem 1 and obtain the
following secrecy capacity region.
Corollary 3. The secrecy capacity region of the parallel BCC with degraded subchannels is
Cs =
⋃
∏
l∈A
[p(ql)p(ul|ql)p(xl|ul)p(yl|xl)p(zl|yl)]
·
∏
l∈Ac
[p(ql)p(ul|ql)p(xl|ul)p(zl|xl)p(yl|zl)]

(R0, R1) :
R0 ≤ min
{∑
l∈A
I(Ql;Yl) +
∑
l∈Ac
I(Xl;Yl),
∑
l∈A
I(Ql;Zl) +
∑
l∈Ac
I(Xl;Zl)
}
,
R1 ≤
∑
l∈A
[
I(Xl;Yl|Ql)− I(Xl;Zl|Ql)
]


.
(18)
Remark 3. It can be seen that the common message W0 is sent over all subchannels, and
the private message W1 for receiver 1 is sent only over the subchannels where the output at
receiver 2 is a degraded version of the output at receiver 1, i.e., l ∈ A. Furthermore, over
these subchannels, the messages W0 and W1 are sent by using the superposition encoding
scheme.
Proof. The achievability follows from Theorem 1 by setting Ul = Xl for l ∈ A and setting
Ql = Ul = Xl for l ∈ Ac.
To show the converse, we first note that for l ∈ Ac,
I(Ql;Yl) ≤ I(Xl;Yl)
I(Ql;Zl) ≤ I(Xl;Zl)
(19)
which follow from the Markov condition Ql → Xl → (YlZl). We apply the bounds in (19) to
the bound on R0 given in (7) and obtain the bound on R0 given in (18).
For l ∈ Ac, we also obtain
I(Ul;Yl|Ql)− I(Ul;Zl|Ql)
≤ I(Ul;YlZl|Ql)− I(Ul;Zl|Ql)
= I(Ul;Zl|Ql) + I(Ul;Yl|QlZl)− I(Ul;Zl|Ql)
= 0
(20)
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where the last equality follows because I(Ul;Yl|QlZl) = 0 due to the degraded condition
(16).
For l ∈ A, we obtain the following bound
I(Ul;Yl|Ql)− I(Ul;Zl|Ql)
= I(XlUl;Yl|Ql)− I(Xl;Yl|QlUl)− I(XlUl;Zl|Ql) + I(Xl;Zl|QlUl)
= I(Xl;Yl|Ql) + I(Ul;Yl|QlXl)− I(Xl;Yl|Ul)
− I(Xl;Zl|Ql)− I(Ul;Zl|QlXl) + I(Xl;Zl|Ul)
(a)
= I(Xl;Yl|Ql)− I(Xl;Yl|Ul)− I(Xl;Zl|Ql) + I(Xl;Zl|Ul)
≤ I(Xl;Yl|Ql)− I(Xl;Yl|Ul)− I(Xl;Zl|Ql) + I(Xl;YlZl|Ul)
= I(Xl;Yl|Ql)− I(Xl;Yl|Ul)− I(Xl;Zl|Ql) + I(Xl;Yl|Ul) + I(Xl;Zl|UlYl)
(b)
≤ I(Xl;Yl|Ql)− I(Xl;Zl|Ql)
(21)
where (a) follows because I(Ul;Yl|QlXl) = 0 and I(Ul;Zl|QlXl) = 0 due to the Markov chain
condition Ql → Ul → Xl → (YlZl), and (b) follows because I(Xl;Zl|UlYl) = 0 due to the
degraded condition (15).
By applying the bounds (20) and (21) to the bound on R1 given in (7), we obtain the
bound on R1 given in (18). This concludes the proof of the converse.
3 Parallel Gaussian BCCs
In this section, we study the parallel Gaussian BCCs, where the channel outputs at receivers 1
and 2 are corrupted by additive Gaussian noise terms. The channel input-output relationship
is given by
Yli = Xli +Wli, Zli = Xli + Vli, for l = 1, . . . , L (22)
where i is the time index. For l = 1, . . . , L, the noise processes {Wli} and {Vli} are in-
dependent identically distributed (i.i.d.) with the components being zero mean Gaussian
random variables with the variances µ2l and ν
2
l , respectively. We assume µ
2
l < ν
2
l for l ∈ A
and µ2l ≥ ν
2
l for l ∈ A
c. The channel input sequence Xn[1,L] is subject to the average power
constraints P , i.e.,
1
n
n∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
X2li ≤ P. (23)
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We now apply Lemma 1 to obtain the secrecy capacity region of the parallel Gaussian
BCC. It can be seen from (22) that the subchannels of the parallel Gaussian BCC are not
physically degraded. We consider the following subchannel:
Yli = Xli +Wli, Zli = Xli +Wli + V
′
li, for l ∈ A;
Yli = Xli + Vli +W
′
li, Zli = Xli + Vli, for l ∈ A
c;
(24)
where {W ′li} and {V
′
li} are i.i.d. random processes with components being zero mean Gaussian
random variables with the variances µ2l −ν
2
l (for l ∈ A
c) and ν2l −µ
2
l (for l ∈ A), respectively.
Moreover, {V ′li} is independent of {Wli} and {W
′
li} is independent of {Vli}. It can be seen
that the channel defined in (24) has physically degraded subchannels. This channel has the
same marginal distributions p(y|x) and p(z|x) as the parallel Gaussian BCC defined in (22).
Hence by Lemma 1, the two channels have the same secrecy capacity region.
For the channel defined in (24), we can apply Corollary 3 to obtain the secrecy capacity
region. In particular, the degradedness of the subchannels allows the use of the entropy
power inequality in the proof of the converse. The secrecy capacity region obtained for this
channel also applies to the parallel Gaussian BCC defined in (22), and is presented in the
following theorem. The details of the proof is relegated to Appendix B.
Theorem 2. The secrecy capacity region of the parallel Gaussian BCC is
Cgs =
⋃
p∈P


(R0, R1) :
R0 ≤ min
{∑
l∈A
1
2
log
(
1 +
pl0
µ2l + pl1
)
+
∑
l∈Ac
1
2
log
(
1 +
pl0
µ2l
)
,
∑
l∈A
1
2
log
(
1 +
pl0
ν2l + pl1
)
+
∑
l∈Ac
1
2
log
(
1 +
pl0
ν2l
)}
R1 ≤
∑
l∈A
[
1
2
log
(
1 +
pl1
µ2l
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 +
pl1
ν2l
)]


. (25)
where p is the power allocation vector, which consists of (pl0, pl1) for l ∈ A and pl0 for l ∈ Ac
as components. The set P includes all power allocation vectors p that satisfy the power
constraint (23), i.e.,
P :=
{
p :
∑
l∈A
[pl0 + pl1] +
∑
l∈Ac
pl0 ≤ P
}
. (26)
Note that p indicates the power allocation among all subchannels. For l ∈ A, since the
source node transmits both common and confidential messages, pl0 and pl1 indicate the
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powers allocated to transmit the common and private messages, respectively. For l ∈ Ac,
the source transmit only the common message, and pl0 indicates the power to transmit the
common message.
If L = 1, the parallel Gaussian BCC becomes the Gaussian BCC. The following secrecy
capacity region of the Gaussian BCC follows directly from Theorem 2.
Corollary 4. The secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian BCC is
Cs =
⋃
0≤β≤1


(R0, R1) :
R0 ≤ min
{
1
2
log
(
1 +
(1− β)P
µ2 + βP
)
,
1
2
log
(
1 +
(1− β)P
ν2 + βP
)}
R1 ≤
[
1
2
log
(
1 +
βP
µ2
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 +
βP
ν2
)]+


(27)
where (x)+ = x if x > 0 and (x)+ = 0 if x ≤ 0.
To characterize the secrecy capacity region of the parallel Gaussian BCC given in (25), we
need to characterize every boundary point and the corresponding power allocation vector
that achieves this boundary point. It is clear that the secrecy capacity region given in (25) is
convex due to the converse proof in Appendix B. Hence the boundary of the secrecy capacity
region can be characterized as follows. For every point (R∗0, R
∗
1) on the boundary, there exist
γ0 > 0 and γ1 > 0 such that (R
∗
0, R
∗
1) is the solution to the following optimization problem
max
(R0,R1)∈C
g
s
[
γ0R0 + γ1R1
]
. (28)
Therefore, the power allocation p∗ that achieves the boundary point (R∗0, R
∗
1) is the solution
to the following optimization problem
max
p∈P
[
γ0R0(p) + γ1R1(p)
]
= max
p∈P
[
γ0min
{
R01(p), R02(p)
}
+ γ1R1(p)
] (29)
where R0(p) and R1(p) indicate the bounds on R0 and R1 in (25). We further define R01(p)
and R02(p) to be the two terms over which the minimization in R0(p) is taken, i.e., R0(p) =
min{R01(p), R02(p)}. The optimization (29) serves as a complete characterization of the
boundary of the secrecy capacity region of the parallel Gaussian BCC. The solution to (29)
provides the power allocations that achieve the boundary of the secrecy capacity region. Our
goal now is to solve the optimization problem (29).
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The optimization problem (29) is a max-min optimization, and can be solved by the
approach used in [47]. The main idea is contained in Proposition 1 in [47], which is stated
in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. The optimal p∗ that solves (29) falls into one of the following three cases:
Case 1: p∗ maximizes γ0R01(p) + γ1R1(p), and R01(p
∗) < R02(p
∗);
Case 2: p∗ maximizes γ0R02(p) + γ1R1(p), and R01(p
∗) > R02(p
∗);
Case 3: p∗ maximizes γ0
(
αR01(p) + α¯R02(p)
)
+ γ1R1(p),
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is such that R01(p
∗) = R02(p
∗), and α¯ = 1− α.
(30)
By applying Lemma 2, we obtain the optimal power allocation p∗ that solves (29).
Theorem 3. The optimal power allocation vector p∗ that solves (29) and hence achieves the
boundary of the secrecy capacity region of the parallel Gaussian BCC has one of the following
three forms.
Case 1: p∗ = p(1) if the following p(1) satisfies R01
(
p(1)
)
< R02
(
p(1)
)
.
For l ∈ A, if
γ1
γ0
>
ν2l
ν2l − µ
2
l
,
p
(1)
l0 =
(
γ0
2λ ln 2
−
(
γ1
γ0
− 1
)
(ν2l − µ
2
l )
)+
,
p
(1)
l1 =
(
min
{
1
2
√
(ν2l − µ
2
l )
(
ν2l − µ
2
l +
2γ1
λ ln 2
)
−
1
2
(
µ2l + ν
2
l
)
,
γ1
γ0
(ν2l − µ
2
l )− ν
2
l
})+
if
γ1
γ0
≤
ν2l
ν2l − µ
2
l
, p
(1)
l0 =
( γ0
2λ ln 2
− µ2l
)+
, p
(1)
l1 = 0
For l ∈ Ac, p(1)l0 =
( γ0
2λ ln 2
− µ2l
)+
(31)
where λ is chosen to satisfy the power constraint
∑
l∈A
[pl0 + pl1] +
∑
l∈Ac
pl0 ≤ P. (32)
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Case 2: p∗ = p(2) if the following p(2) satisfies R01
(
p(2)
)
> R02
(
p(2)
)
.
For l ∈ A, if
γ1
γ0
>
µ2l
ν2l − µ
2
l
,
p
(2)
l0 =
(
γ0
2λ ln 2
−
(
γ1
γ0
+ 1
)
(ν2l − µ
2
l )
)+
,
p
(2)
l1 =
(
min
{
1
2
√
(ν2l − µ
2
l )
(
ν2l − µ
2
l +
2γ1
λ ln 2
)
−
1
2
(
µ2l + ν
2
l
)
,
γ1
γ0
(ν2l − µ
2
l )− µ
2
l
})+
if
γ1
γ0
≤
µ2l
ν2l − µ
2
l
, p
(2)
l0 =
( γ0
2λ ln 2
− ν2l
)+
, p
(1)
l1 = 0
For l ∈ Ac, p(2)l0 =
( γ0
2λ ln 2
− ν2l
)+
(33)
where λ is chosen to satisfy the power constraint defined in (32).
Case 3: p∗ = p(α) if there exists 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 such that the following p(α) satisfies R01
(
p(α)
)
=
R02
(
p(α)
)
.
For l ∈ A, if
γ1
γ0
>
αν2l + α¯µ
2
l
ν2l − µ
2
l
,
p
(α)
l0 =
(
1
2
√(
ν2l − µ
2
l −
γ0
2 ln 2λ
)2
+
2αγ0
λ ln 2
(ν2l − µ
2
l ) +
γ0
4 ln 2λ
−
(
γ1
γ0
− α +
1
2
)
(ν2l − µ
2
l )
)+
,
p
(α)
l1 =
(
min
{
1
2
√
(ν2l − µ
2
l )
(
ν2l − µ
2
l +
2γ1
λ ln 2
)
−
1
2
(
µ2l + ν
2
l
)
,
γ1
γ0
(ν2l − µ
2
l )− (αν
2
l + α¯µ
2
l )
})+
if
γ1
γ0
≤
αν2l + α¯µ
2
l
ν2l − µ
2
l
,
p
(α)
l0 =
(
1
2
√(
ν2l − µ
2
l −
γ0
2 ln 2λ
)2
+
2αγ0
λ ln 2
(ν2l − µ
2
l )−
1
2
(
µ2l + ν
2
l −
γ0
2 ln 2λ
))+
,
p
(α)
l1 = 0
For l ∈ Ac, p(α)l0 =
(
1
2
√(
ν2l − µ
2
l −
γ0
2 ln 2λ
)2
+
2αγ0
λ ln 2
(ν2l − µ
2
l )−
1
2
(
µ2l + ν
2
l −
γ0
2 ln 2λ
))+
(34)
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where λ is chosen to satisfy the power constraint defined in (32).
The proof of Theorem 3 is relegated to Appendix C. Based on Theorem 3, we provide the
following algorithm to find the optimal p∗.
Algorithm to search p∗ that solves (29)
Step 1. Find p(1) given in (31).
If R01
(
p(1)
)
< R02
(
p(1)
)
, then p∗ = p(1) and finish.
Otherwise, go to Step 2.
Step 2. Find p(2) given in (33).
If R01
(
p(2)
)
> R02
(
p(2)
)
, then p∗ = p(2) and finish.
Otherwise, go to Step 3.
Step 3. For a given α, find p(α) given in (34).
Search over 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 to find α that satisfies R01
(
p(α)
)
= R02
(
p(α)
)
.
Then p∗ = p(α) and finish.
4 Fading BCCs: Ergodic Secrecy Capacity Region
In this section, we study the fading BCC (see Fig. 4), where the channels from the source
node to receivers 1 and 2 are corrupted by multiplicative fading gain processes in addition
to additive white Gaussian processes. The channel input-output relationship is given by
Yi = h1iXi +Wi,
Zi = h2iXi + Vi,
(35)
where i is the time index, Xi is the channel input at the time instant i, and Yi and Zi are
channel outputs at the time instant i at receivers 1 and 2, respectively. The channel gain
coefficients h1i and h2i are proper complex random variables. We define hi := (h1i, h2i), and
assume {hi} is a stationary and ergodic vector random process. The noise processes {Wi}
and {Vi} are zero-mean i.i.d. proper complex Gaussian with Wi and Vi having variances µ2
and ν2, respectively. The input sequence {Xi} is subject to the average power constraint P ,
i.e., 1
n
∑n
i=1 E
[
X2i
]
≤ P .
We assume that the channel state information (i.e., the realization of hi) is known at both
the transmitter and the receivers instantaneously. The channel state information at the
source node can be realized by a reliable feedback from the two receivers, who are supposed
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Figure 4: Fading BCC
to receive information from the source node. Depending on the channel state information, the
source node can dynamically change its transmission power to achieve better performance.
In this section, we assume that there are no delay constraints on the transmitted messages,
and the performance criterion we study, i.e., the secrecy capacity region, is averaged over all
channel states and is referred to as the ergodic secrecy capacity region.
It can be seen that for a given fading state, i.e., a realization of hi, the fading BCC is a
Gaussian BCC. Hence the fading BCC can be viewed as a parallel Gaussian BCC with each
fading state corresponding to one subchannel. Thus, the following secrecy capacity region
of the fading BCC follows from Theorem 2.
Corollary 5. The secrecy capacity region of the fading BCC is
Cs =
⋃
p(h)∈P


(R0, R1) :
R0 ≤ min
{
Eh∈A log
(
1 +
p0(h)|h1|2
µ2 + p1(h)|h1|2
)
+ Eh∈Ac log
(
1 +
p0(h)|h1|2
µ2
)
,
Eh∈A log
(
1 +
p0(h)|h2|2
ν2 + p1(h)|h2|2
)
+ Eh∈Ac log
(
1 +
p0(h)|h2|2
ν2
)}
R1 ≤ Eh∈A
[
log
(
1 +
p1(h)|h1|
2
µ2
)
− log
(
1 +
p1(h)|h2|
2
ν2
)]


.
(36)
where A :=
{
h : |h1|
2
µ2
> |h2|
2
ν2
}
. The random vector h = (h1, h2) has the same distribution as
the marginal distribution of the process {hi} at one time instant. The set P is defined as
P =
{
p(h) : EA [p0(h) + p1(h)] + EAc [p0(h)] ≤ P
}
. (37)
Remark 4. The secrecy capacity region given in Corollary 5 is established for general fading
processes {hi} where only ergodic and stationary conditions are assumed. The fading process
{hi} can be correlated across time, and is not necessarily Gaussian.
Remark 5. The secrecy capacity region given in Corollary 5 also applies to the case in which
the two component processes {h1i} and {h2i} are correlated. However, the secrecy capacity
region does depend on the correlation between the two processes. In fact, the average Eh in
(36) needs to be taken over the joint distributions of h1i and h2i to derive the correct secrecy
capacity region.
This fact can be seen from the following example. We assume only the confidential message
is transmitted, i.e., R0 = 0. We also assume that both h1i and h2i take the values of (0, 1)
with equal probability (1/2, 1/2). We first consider case 1 in which h1i = h2i. From (36) it
is clear that R1 = 0, i.e., no secrecy capacity is possible, because the channels to the two
receivers are the same for all channel realizations. However, for case 2 in which h1i = 1−h2i,
from (36) the secrecy capacity equals log
(
1 + 2P
µ2
)
, where the power is only allocated to the
channel states where h1i = 1 and h2i = 0. From this example, one can see that the correlation
between h1i and h2i affects the secrecy capacity region, although the marginal distributions
of h1i and h2i are same for the two cases. We further note that this fact is consistent with
Lemma 1 because h1i and h2i are now considered as channel parameters (with each realization
corresponding to one subchannel) due to CSI availability at the transmitter. The channel
statistics come only from the additive Gaussian noise terms for each subchannel with one
realization of h1i and h2i.
Remark 6. The secrecy capacity region in Corollary 5 is established for the case with general
correlation between the noise variables Wi and Vi.
From the bound on R1 in (36), it can be seen that as long as A is not a zero probability
event, positive secrecy rate can be achieved. Since fading introduces more randomness to the
channel, it is more likely that the channel from the source node to receiver 1 is better than
the channel from the source node to receiver 2 for some channel states, and hence positive
secrecy capacity can be achieved by exploiting these channel states.
Since the source node is assumed to know the channel state information, it can allocate its
power according to the instantaneous channel realization to achieve the best performance,
i.e., the boundary of secrecy capacity region. The optimal power allocation that achieves the
boundary of the secrecy capacity region for the fading BCC can be derived from Theorem 3
and is given in the following.
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Corollary 6. The optimal power allocation p∗(h) that achieves the boundary of the secrecy
capacity region of the fading BCC falls into one of the following three cases.
Case 1: p∗(h) = p(1)(h) if the following p(1)(h) satisfies R01(p
(1)(h)) < R02(p
(1)(h)).
For h ∈ A, if
γ1
γ0
>
ν2|h1|
2
ν2|h1|2 − µ2|h2|2
,
p
(1)
0 (h) =
(
γ0
λ ln 2
−
(
γ1
γ0
− 1
)(
ν2
|h2|2
−
µ2
|h1|2
))+
,
p
(1)
1 (h) =
(
min
{
1
2
√(
ν2
|h2|2
−
µ2
|h1|2
)(
ν2
|h2|2
−
µ2
|h1|2
+
4γ1
λ ln 2
)
−
1
2
(
µ2
|h1|2
+
ν2
|h2|2
)
,
γ1
γ0
(
ν2
|h2|2
−
µ2
|h1|2
)
−
ν2
|h2|2
})+
if
γ1
γ0
≤
ν2|h1|
2
ν2|h1|2 − µ2|h2|2
, p
(1)
0 (h) =
(
γ0
λ ln 2
−
µ2
|h1|2
)+
, p
(1)
1 (h) = 0
For h ∈ Ac, p(1)0 (h) =
(
γ0
λ ln 2
−
µ2
|h1|2
)+
.
(38)
The parameter λ is chosen to satisfy the following power constraint
EA [p0(h) + p1(h)] + EAc [p0(h)] ≤ P. (39)
Case 2: p∗(h) = p(2)(h) if the following p(2)(h) satisfies R01(p
(2)(h)) > R02(p
(2)(h)).
For h ∈ A, if
γ1
γ0
>
µ2|h2|2
ν2|h1|2 − µ2|h2|2
,
p
(2)
0 (h) =
(
γ0
λ ln 2
−
(
γ1
γ0
+ 1
)(
ν2
|h2|2
−
µ2
|h1|2
))+
,
p
(2)
1 (h) =
(
min
{
1
2
√(
ν2
|h2|2
−
µ2
|h1|2
)(
ν2
|h2|2
−
µ2
|h1|2
+
4γ1
λ ln 2
)
−
1
2
(
µ2
|h1|2
+
ν2
|h2|2
)
,
γ1
γ0
(
ν2
|h2|2
−
µ2
|h1|2
)
−
µ2
|h1|2
})+
if
γ1
γ0
≤
µ2|h2|2
ν2|h1|2 − µ2|h2|2
, p
(2)
0 (h) =
(
γ0
λ ln 2
−
ν2
|h2|2
)+
, p
(1)
1 (h) = 0
For h ∈ Ac, p(2)0 (h) =
(
γ0
λ ln 2
−
ν2
|h2|2
)+
(40)
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where λ is chosen to satisfy the power constraint defined in (39).
Case 3: p∗(h) = p(α)(h) if there exists 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 such that the following p(α)(h) satisfies
R01(p
(α)(h)) = R02(p
(α)(h)).
For h ∈ A, if
γ1
γ0
>
αν2|h1|
2 + α¯µ2|h2|
2
ν2|h1|2 − µ2|h2|2
,
p
(α)
0 (h) =
(
1
2
√(
ν2
|h2|2
−
µ2
|h1|2
−
γ0
2 lnλ
)2
+
4αγ0
λ ln 2
(
ν2
|h2|2
−
µ2
|h1|2
)
+
γ0
2 ln 2λ
−
(
γ1
γ0
− α +
1
2
)(
ν2
|h2|2
−
µ2
|h1|2
))+
,
p
(α)
1 (h) =
(
min
{
1
2
√(
ν2
|h2|2
−
µ2
|h1|2
)(
ν2
|h2|2
−
µ2
|h1|2
+
4γ1
λ ln 2
)
−
1
2
(
µ2
|h1|2
+
ν2
|h2|2
)
,
γ1
γ0
(
ν2
|h2|2
−
µ2
|h1|2
)
−
(
α
ν2
|h2|2
+ α¯
µ2
|h1|2
)})+
if
γ1
γ0
≤
αν2|h1|2 + α¯µ2|h2|2
ν2|h1|2 − µ2|h2|2
,
p
(α)
0 (h) =
(
1
2
√(
ν2
|h2|2
−
µ2
|h1|2
−
γ0
2 lnλ
)2
+
4αγ0
λ ln 2
(
ν2
|h2|2
−
µ2
|h1|2
)
−
1
2
(
µ2
|h1|2
+
ν2
|h2|2
−
γ0
λ ln 2
))+
,
p
(α)
1 (h) = 0
For l ∈ Ac, p(α)0 (h) =
(
1
2
√(
ν2
|h2|2
−
µ2
|h1|2
−
γ0
λ ln 2
)2
+
4αγ0
λ ln 2
(
ν2
|h2|2
−
µ2
|h1|2
)
−
1
2
(
µ2
|h1|2
+
ν2
|h2|2
−
γ0
λ ln 2
))+
(41)
where λ is chosen to satisfy the power constraint defined in (39).
If the source node does not have common messages for both receivers, and only has con-
fidential messages for receiver 1, the fading BCC becomes the fading wire-tap channel. For
this channel, the secrecy capacity is readily obtained from Corollaries 5 and 6.
21
Corollary 7. The secrecy capacity of the fading wire-tap channel is
Cs = max
EA[p(h)]≤P
EA
[
log
(
1 +
p(h)|h1|
2
µ2
)
− log
(
1 +
p(h)|h2|
2
ν2
)]
. (42)
The optimal power allocation that achieves the secrecy capacity in (42) is given by
p∗(h) =


(
1
λ ln 2
−
µ2
|h1|2
)+
, if |h2|
2 = 0;
(
1
2
√(
ν2
|h2|2
−
µ2
|h1|2
)(
4
λ ln 2
−
µ2
|h1|2
+
ν2
|h2|2
)
−
1
2
(
µ2
|h1|2
+
ν2
|h2|2
))+
,
if |h2|
2 > 0, h ∈ A;
0, otherwise
(43)
where λ is chosen to satisfy the power constraint EA[p(h)] = P .
5 Fading BCCs: Outage Performance
In Section 4, we considered the ergodic secrecy capacity region for the fading BCC. In this
case, messages can be coded over long block lengths and hence over all channel realizations.
This applies to wireless systems in which the transmission delay can be tolerant. In this
section, we consider wireless systems in which there is a stringent delay constraint, and
messages must be transmitted within a certain time.
We adopt the channel model described in (35). However, we now take the block fading
assumption, where the fading coefficients h1i and h2i remain constant over one block and
change to another realization in the next block in an ergodic and stationary matter. More-
over, we assume that the block length is large enough such that coding over one block can
achieve small probability of error. We assume that the delay constraint is within the block
length. Coding over multiple blocks and hence over multiple channel state realizations is not
allowed. We also assume that both the transmitter and the receivers know the channel state
information.
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We use (Rˇ0, Rˇ1) to indicate a target rate pair, i.e., the common and confidential messages
need to be transmitted to the two receivers at the rates Rˇ0 and Rˇ1, respectively, in each
block (each fading state realization). If the target rate pair is not achieved for one block, an
outage is claimed. We define the outage probability to be
Pout = Pr{(Rˇ0, Rˇ1) /∈ Cs(h, p(h))} (44)
where Cs(h, p(h)) is the secrecy capacity region for the channel with fading state realization
h, and p(h) indicates the transmission power used by the source node for this fading state.
The source node is able to adapt its transmission power to the instantaneous channel state
realization, i.e., p(h) is a function of h, because CSI is assumed to be known at the transmit-
ter. We assume that the power constraint applies over a large number of blocks and hence
over all fading state realizations (i.e., it is a long term power constraint as in [16]); that is,
we assume
E[p(h)] ≤ P. (45)
We define the set P := {p(h) : E[p(h)] ≤ P}.
It is clear from (44) that the outage probability depends on the power allocation function
p(h). Our goal is to study the power allocation p∗(h) that minimizes the outage probability,
i.e.,
min
p(h)∈P
Pout. (46)
To understand this problem, we note that for each channel state the source node knows
how much power it needs to use to support the target rate pair. If the power needed is too
large, the source node may decide not to transmit and claim outage in order to save power
for other channel states that need lower power to support the target rate pair. Hence the
source node first allocates power to those channel states that need lower power to support
the target rate, and then to those channel states that need higher power to support the
target rate until all power is utilized. This suggests that the power allocation is a threshold
decision.
To formally solve the optimization problem (46), we apply the approach in [16], where the
minimum outage probability of the fading channel without a secrecy constraint was studied.
This approach was also applied in [10] to study the minimum outage probability of the
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fading broadcast channel without a secrecy constraint. In the following, we describe the
power allocation that minimizes the outage probability of the fading BCC, i.e., the solution
to (46).
For a given block with the fading state realization h = (h1, h2), the channel we consider is
a Gaussian BCC. From Corollary 4, the secrecy capacity region is given as follows.
If h ∈ A,
Cs(h, p(h)) =
⋃
0≤β≤1


(R0, R1) :
R0 ≤ log
(
1 +
(1− β)p(h)|h2|2
ν2 + βp(h)|h2|2
)
,
R1 ≤ log
(
1 +
βp(h)|h1|
2
µ2
)
− log
(
1 +
βp(h)|h2|
2
ν2
)


If h ∈ Ac,
Cs(h, p(h)) =


(R0, R1) :
R0 ≤ log
(
1 +
p(h)|h1|2
µ2
)
,
R1 = 0


(47)
We now use (47) to compute the minimum power that is needed to achieve the target rate
pair (Rˇ0, Rˇ1). It is clear from (47) that, only when h ∈ A can we possibly achieve a positive
Rˇ1. The minimum power needed to achieve Rˇ1 is
βp(h) =


2Rˇ1 − 1
|h1|2
µ2
− 2Rˇ1 |h2|
2
ν2
, if Rˇ1 < log
|h1|2ν2
|h2|2µ2
∞ otherwise
(48)
The minimum power to support Rˇ0 is then given by
(1− β)p(h) =


(
2Rˇ0 − 1
)(
|h1|2ν2
|h2|2µ2
− 1
)
|h1|2
µ2
− 2Rˇ1 |h2|
2
ν2
, if Rˇ1 < log
|h1|2ν2
|h2|2µ2
∞ otherwise
(49)
Hence the minimum power needed to support (Rˇ0, Rˇ1) is
pmin(h) =


2Rˇ0
(
|h1|2ν2
|h2|2µ2
− 1
)
+ 2Rˇ1 − |h1|
2ν2
|h2|2µ2
|h1|2
µ2
− 2Rˇ1 |h2|
2
ν2
, if Rˇ1 < log
|h1|2ν2
|h2|2µ2
∞ otherwise
(50)
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For s > 0, we define
R(s) =
{
h : pmin(h) < s
}
R¯(s) =
{
h : pmin(h) ≤ s
} (51)
where pmin(h) is given in (50).
The average powers that are needed to support the rate pair (Rˇ0, Rˇ1) for the channel states
in R(s) and R¯(s) are
p(s) = Eh∈R(s)
[
pmin(h)
]
p¯(s) = Eh∈R¯(s)
[
pmin(h)
] (52)
For the given power constraint P , define
s∗ = sup{s : p(s) < P}
w∗ =
P − p(s∗)
p¯(s∗)− p(s∗)
(53)
By using (50) and applying Lemma 3 and Proposition 4 in [16], we obtain the following
optimal power allocation p∗(h).
Proposition 1. The power allocation p∗(h) that solves (46), and hence minimizes the outage
probability for a given target rate pair (Rˇ0, Rˇ1), is given by
p∗(h) =


pmin(h), if h ∈ R(s∗)
pmin(h), with probability w∗ if h ∈ R¯(s∗)\R(s∗)
0 if h /∈ R¯(s∗)
(54)
where pmin(h) is given in (50).
It can be seen that the optimal power allocation p∗(h) is a threshold solution. The power is
first allocated to the fading states that need smaller amounts of power to achieve the target
rate pair, and is then allocated to the fading states that need larger amounts of power to
achieve the target rate pair. When the total power P is used up by these fading states, no
further power is allocated to other states.
In the above problem setting, an outage is claimed if either Rˇ0 or Rˇ1 is not achieved. This
results in an optimal solution p∗(h) that allocates power only to those states for which both
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Rˇ0 and Rˇ1 can be achieved by relatively small power consumption. However, some channel
states may support one target rate with small power consumption, but need a large amount
of power to support both rates. These states are unlikely to be allocated power. For example,
even if the channels from the source node to both receivers are good to transmit common
messages, it may happen that no power is allocated to this fading state if the channel from
the source node to receiver 1 is worse than the channel from the source node to receiver 2
so that Rˇ1 cannot be achieved. Sometimes this is not reasonable, because the two messages
are independent, and one message should be transmitted whenever the channel is good to
transmit it. It should not depend on whether the other message is transmitted or not.
Nevertheless, the solution to the problem (46) we have considered is useful if we consider
the following two more reasonable problems.
It is clear that the solution to the problem (46) immediately implies the optimal power
allocation for the case where only the confidential message is transmitted and only the target
rate Rˇ1 is assumed. Now the minimum power to achieve Rˇ1 is given by
Pmin(h) =


2Rˇ1 − 1
|h1|2
µ2
− 2Rˇ1 |h2|
2
ν2
, if Rˇ1 < log
|h1|2ν2
|h2|2µ2
∞ otherwise
(55)
The power allocation that minimizes the outage probability follows from Proposition 1 by
using (55) to replace (50) in (54).
We next consider the scenario in which the source node has both common and confidential
messages to transmit. We assume that the common message is required to be transmitted
at a constant rate Rˇ0 for all channel states, i.e., no outage is allowed for the common rate.
This scenario applies to wireless systems where a constant common rate must be satisfied.
Since Rˇ0 must be achieved for all channel states, the total power must be large enough to
support this rate, i.e.,
P ≥ P0 := E[p0(h)] (56)
where p0(h) is the power that is needed to support the rate Rˇ0 for the channel state h and
is given by
p0(h) =
2Rˇ0 − 1
min
{
|h1|2
µ2
, |h2|
2
ν2
} (57)
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In addition to the common message, the source node wishes to transmit confidential infor-
mation to receiver 1 at a target rate Rˇ1 and with as small an outage probability as possible.
We note that a similar problem was studied in [10] for the broadcast channel with separate
messages for two receivers and the rate to one receiver must be constant for all channel
states.
We need to find the power allocation that minimizes the outage probability that the target
rate Rˇ1 is not achieved. The optimization problem is summarized as follows:
Minimize Pr{(Rˇ0, Rˇ1} /∈ C(h, p(h))}
Subject to E[p(h)] ≤ P
Rˇ0 is achieved for all h, i.e., p(h) ≥ p0(h)
(58)
We can change the problem (58) to the following equivalent problem
Minimize Pr{(Rˇ0, Rˇ1} /∈ C(h, p(h))}
Subject to E[∆p(h)] ≤ P − P0
(59)
where ∆p(h) = p(h)− p0(h) is the difference between the power needed to support (Rˇ0, Rˇ1)
and the power needed to support Rˇ0 only.
It can be seen that the problem (59) is the same as the problem (46) with p(h) in (46)
being replaced by ∆p(h). Thus the optimal ∆p∗(h) can be derived from Proposition 1 with
pmin(h) in (54) being replaced by ∆pmin(h), which is the minimum difference between the
power needed to support (Rˇ0, Rˇ1) and the power needed to support Rˇ0 and is given by
∆pmin(h) =


2Rˇ0
(
2Rˇ1 − 1
)
|h1|2
µ2
− 2Rˇ1 |h2|
2
ν2
, if Rˇ1 < log
|h1|2ν2
|h2|2µ2
∞ otherwise.
(60)
6 Numerical Results
In this section, we provide numerical results to demonstrate the ergodic and outage perfor-
mance for the fading BCC.
We first consider the Rayleigh fading BCC, where h1 and h2 are zero mean proper complex
Gaussian random variables. Hence |h1|2 and |h2|2 are exponentially distributed with param-
eters σ1 and σ2. We assume the source power P = 5 dB, and fix σ1 = 1. In Fig. 5, we plot
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Figure 5: Secrecy capacity regions for a Rayleigh fading BCC
the boundaries of the secrecy capacity regions corresponding to σ2 = 0.4, 0.7, 1, respectively.
It can be seen that as σ2 decreases, the secrecy rate R1 of the confidential message improves,
but the rate R0 of the common message decreases. This fact follows because smaller σ2
implies worse channel from the source node to receiver 2. Thus, confidential information can
be forwarded to receiver 1 at a larger rate. However, the rate of the common information is
limited by the worse channel from the source node to receiver 2.
For the Rayleigh fading BCC with σ1 = 1 and σ2 = 0.4, we plot the boundary of the
secrecy capacity region in Fig. 6. The three cases (see Corollary 6) to derive the boundary
achieving power allocations are also indicated with the corresponding boundary points. It
can be seen that the boundary points with large R1 are achieved by the power allocations
derived from Case 1, and are indicated by the line with circle on the graph. The boundary
points with large R0 are achieved by the optimal power allocations derived from Case 2, and
are indicated by the line with square. Between the boundary points achieved by Case 1 and
Case 2, the boundary points are achieved by the power allocations derived from Case 3, and
are indicated by the plain solid line.
The intuitive reason how the three cases associate with the boundary points is given as
follows. To achieve large secrecy rate R1, most channel states in the set A where receiver 1
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Figure 6: Three cases in power allocation optimization to achieve the boundary of the secrecy
capacity region for a Rayleigh fading BCC
has a stronger channel than receiver 2 are used to transmit the confidential message. The
common message is hence transmitted mostly over the channel states in the set Ac, over
which the common rate is limited by the channel from the source node to receiver 1. Thus,
power allocation needs to optimize the rate of this channel, and hence the optimal power
allocation follows from Case 1. To achieve large R0, the common message is forwarded over
the channel states both in A and Ac. It can be seen that in average the source node has a
much worse channel to receiver 2 than to receiver 1, and hence the channel from the source
node to receiver 2 limits the common rate. Power allocation now needs to optimize the rate
to receiver 2, and the optimal power allocation follows from Case 2. Between these two cases,
power allocation needs to balance the rates to receivers 1 and 2 and hence follows from Case
3.
We next consider the case in which R0 = 0, i.e., only the confidential message is transmitted
from the source node to receiver 1. We assume σ1 = σ2 = 1. In Fig. 7 (a), we plot the optimal
power allocation p∗1(h) as a function of h. It can be seen from the graph that most of the
source power is allocated to the channel states with small |h2|2. This behavior is shown
more clearly in Fig. 7 (b), which plots p∗1(h) as a function of |h1|
2 for different values of |h2|2,
and in Fig. 7 (c), which plots p∗1(h) as a function of |h2|
2 for different values of |h1|
2. The
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source node allocates more power to the channel states with larger |h1|2 to forward more
confidential information to the destination node, and allocates less power for the channel
states with larger |h2|2 to prevent receiver 2 to obtain the confidential information. It can
also be seen from Fig. 7 (b) and Fig. 7 (c) that the source node transmits only when the
channel from the source node to receiver 1 is better than the channel from the source node
to receiver 2.
For the case in which R0 = 0, Fig. 8 plots the secrecy capacity achieved by the optimal
power allocation, and compares it with the secrecy rate achieved by a uniform power allo-
cation, i.e., allocating the same power for all channel states h ∈ A. It can be seen that the
uniform power allocation does not provide performance close to the secrecy capacity for the
SNRs of interest. This is in contrast to the Rayleigh fading channel without the secrecy
constraint, where the uniform power allocation can be close to optimal even for moderate
SNRs. This also demonstrates that the exact channel state information is important to
achieve higher secrecy rate.
We now consider the outage performance of the Rayleigh fading BCC. We assume σ1 = 10
and σ2 = 0.5. We first assume the target rate Rˇ0 = 0, i.e., only the confidential message
is transmitted. In Fig. 9, we plot the outage probabilities corresponding to different values
of the target rate Rˇ1. The outage probability decreases as the target rate Rˇ1 decreases.
For a fixed Rˇ1, the outage probability is bounded below by a certain threshold. This fact
follows because the outage probability cannot be prevented for those channel states where
the channel from the source node to receiver 1 is worse than the channel from the source node
to receiver 2. In Fig. 10, we compare the outage probability when R0 = 0 with the outage
probability when R0 = 0.1 bps/Hz. It can be seen that even a small positive common rate Rˇ0
can cause large increase in outage probability. In Fig. 11, we compare the outage probability
minimized by the power allocation and that achieved by the equal power allocation for all
channel states. It can be seen that optimizing power allocation significantly reduces the
outage probability.
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7 Conclusions
We have established the secrecy capacity region of the parallel BCC, where a converse proof is
given to show that independent input to each subchannel is optimal. We have also established
the secrecy capacity region for the parallel Gaussian BCC, and have characterized the optimal
power allocations that achieve the boundary of this region. One fundamental result we have
established is the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian BCC, which complements the
secrecy capacity region of the discrete memoryless BCC given by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner in [5].
We have further applied our results to obtain the ergodic secrecy capacity region for the
fading BCC and the optimal power allocations that achieve the boundary of the secrecy
capacity region. Our results generalize the secrecy capacity results that have been recently
obtained in [12], [13] and [14] (full CSI case). We have also studied the outage perfor-
mance of the fading BCC. We have obtained the power allocation that minimizes the outage
probability that certain target rates are not achieved.
Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 1
The achievability follows from [5, Corollary 1] by setting Q = (Q1, . . . , QL) (Q is indicated by
U in [5]), U = (U1, . . . , UL) (U is indicated by V in [5]), X = (X1, . . . , XL), Y = (Y1, . . . , YL),
and Z = (Z1, . . . , ZL) with Q, U and X having independent components. Furthermore, we
choose the components of these random vectors to satisfy the Markov chain conditions:
Ql → Ul → Xl → (Yl, Zl) for l = 1, 2, . . . , L.
To show the converse, we consider a code
(
2nR0 , 2nR1, n
)
with the average error probability
Pe. The probability distribution on W0 ×W1 × X n[1,L] × Y
n
[1,L] × Z
n
[1,L] is given by
p(w0, w1, x
n
[1,L], y
n
[1,L], z
n
[1,L])
= p(w0)p(w1)p(x
n
[1,L]|w0, w1)
n∏
i=1
L∏
l=1
pl(yli, zli|xli)
(61)
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By Fano’s inequality [46, Sec. 2.11], we have
H(W0,W1|Y
n
[1,L]) ≤ n(R0 + R1)Pe + 1 := nδ1
H(W0|Z
n
[1,L]) ≤ nR0Pe + 1 := nδ2
(62)
where δ1, δ2 → 0 if Pe → 0.
For l = 1, 2, . . . , L, we define the following auxiliary random variables:
Qli := (W0, Y
n
[1,l−1], Y
i−1
l , Z
n
l[i+1], Z
n
[l+1,L]),
Uli := (W1, Qli).
(63)
We note that (Qli, Uli, Xli, Yli, Zli) satisfies the following Markov chain condition:
Qli → Uli → Xli → (Yli, Zli). (64)
We first bound the common rate R0 as follows.
nR0 = H(W0) = I
(
W0;Y
n
[1,L]
)
+H
(
W0|Y
n
[1,L]
)
(a)
≤
L∑
l=1
I(W0;Y
n
l |Y
n
[1,l−1]) + nδ1
(b)
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(W0;Yli|Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l ) + nδ1
(c)
≤
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(W0Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L];Yli) + nδ1
(d)
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(Qli;Yli) + nδ1
(65)
where (a) follows from the chain rule and Fano’s inequality, (b) follows from the chain rule,
(c) follows because I(A;B|C) ≤ I(A,C;B), and (d) follows from the definition (63).
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We can also bound the common rate R0 as follows.
nR0 = H(W0) = I
(
W0;Z
n
[1,L]
)
+H
(
W0|Z
n
[1,L]
)
≤
L∑
l=1
I(W0;Z
n
l |Z
n
[l+1,L]) + nδ2
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(W0;Zli|Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L]) + nδ2
≤
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(W0Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L];Zli) + nδ2
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(Qli;Zli) + nδ2
(66)
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We now bound the rate R1 and obtain:
nR1
(a)
= nRe ≤ H
(
W1|Z
n
[1,L]
)
= H
(
W1|W0Z
n
[1,L]
)
+ I(W1;W0|Z
n
[1,L])
(b)
≤ I(W1;Y
n
[1,L]|W0)− I(W1;Z
n
[1,L]|W0) +H
(
W1|W0Y
n
[1,L]
)
+H
(
W0|Z
n
[1,L]
)
(c)
≤ I(W1;Y
n
[1,L]|W0)− I(W1;Z
n
[1,L]|W0) + n(δ1 + δ2)
=
L∑
l=1
[
I(W1;Y
n
l |W0Y
n
[1,l−1])− I(W1;Z
n
l |W0Z
n
[l+1,L])
]
+ n(δ1 + δ2)
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1;Yli|W0Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l )− I(W1;Zli|W0Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L])
]
+ n(δ1 + δ2)
(d)
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L];Yli|W0Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l )− I(Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L];Yli|W0W1Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l )
− I(W1Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l ;Zli|W0Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L]) + I(Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l ;Zli|W0W1Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L])
]
+ n(δ1 + δ2)
(e)
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L];Yli|W0Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l )− I(W1Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l ;Zli|W0Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L])
]
+ n(δ1 + δ2)
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
[
I(Znl[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L];Yli|W0Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l ) + I(W1;Yli|W0Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L])
− I(Y n[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l ;Zli|W0Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L])− I(W1;Zli|W0Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L])
]
+ n(δ1 + δ2)
(f)
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1;Yli|W0Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L])− I(W1;Zli|W0Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L])
]
+ n(δ1 + δ2)
(g)
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
[
I(Uli;Yli|Qli)− I(Uli;Zli|Qli)
]
+ n(δ1 + δ2)
(67)
where (a) follows from the perfect secrecy condition, (b) follows because I(W1;W0|Zn[1,L]) ≤
H
(
W0|Z
n
[1,L]
)
, (c) follows from Fano’s inequality, (d) follows from the chain rule, (e) and (f)
follow from Lemma 7 in [5], and (g) follows from the definition (63).
We introduce a random variable G that is independent of all other random variables, and
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is uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , n}. Define Ql = (G,QlG), Ul = (G,UlG), Xl = XlG,
Yl = YlG, and Zl = ZlG for l = 1, . . . , L. Note that (Ql, Ul, Xl, Yl, Zl) satisfies the following
Markov chain condition:
Ql → Ul → Xl → (Yl, Zl), for l = 1, . . . , L. (68)
Using the above definitions, (65), (66) and (67) become
R0 ≤
L∑
l=1
I(QlG;YlG|G) + δ1 ≤
L∑
l=1
I(Ql;Yl) + δ1
R0 ≤
L∑
l=1
I(QlG;ZlG|G) + δ2 ≤
L∑
l=1
I(Ql;Zl) + δ2
R1 ≤
L∑
l=1
I(Ul;Yl|Ql)− I(Ul;Zl|Ql)
]
+ δ1 + δ2
(69)
Therefore, an outer bound on the secrecy capacity region Cs is given by the following set:
⋃{
(R0, R1) that satisfy (69)
}
(70)
where the union is over all probability distributions p(q[1,L], u[1,L], x[1,L], y[1,L], z[1,L]). Fi-
nally, we note that each term in (69) depends only on the distribution p(ql, ul, xl, yl, zl).
Hence there is no loss of optimality to consider only those distributions that have the form∏L
l=1 p(ql, ul, xl)p(yl, zl|xl). This concludes the converse proof.
B Proof of Theorem 2
By Lemma 1, we need to prove Theorem 2 only for the channel defined by (24).
The achievability follows by applying Corollary 3 and choosing the following input distri-
bution
for l ∈ A, Ql ∼ N (0, pl0), X
′
l ∼ N (0, pl1) with X
′
l independent of Ql,
Xl = Ql +X
′
l ;
for l ∈ Ac; Xl ∼ N (0, pl0).
(71)
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To show the converse, we first apply (65) and obtain
nR0 ≤
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(Qli;Yli) + nδ1
≤
∑
l∈A
n∑
i=1
I(Qli;Yli) +
∑
l∈Ac
n∑
i=1
I(Xli;Yli) + nδ1
=
∑
l∈A
n∑
i=1
[h(Yli)− h(Yli|Qli)] +
∑
l∈Ac
n∑
i=1
[h(Yli)− h(Yli|Xli)] + nδ1
≤
∑
l∈A
n∑
i=1
1
2
log 2pie
(
EX2li + µ
2
l
)
−
∑
l∈A
n∑
i=1
h(Yli|Qli)
+
∑
l∈Ac
n∑
i=1
1
2
log 2pie
(
EX2li + µ
2
l
)
−
∑
l∈Ac
n
2
log 2pieµ2l + nδ1
≤
∑
l∈A
n
2
log 2pie
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
EX2li + µ
2
l
)
−
∑
l∈A
n∑
i=1
h(Yli|Qli)
+
∑
l∈Ac
n
2
log 2pie
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
EX2li + µ
2
l
)
−
∑
l∈Ac
n
2
log 2pieµ2l + nδ1
≤
∑
l∈A
n
2
log 2pie
(
pl + µ
2
l
)
−
∑
l∈A
n∑
i=1
h(Yli|Qli) +
∑
l∈Ac
n
2
log
(
1 +
pl
µ2l
)
+ nδ1
(72)
where we define pl =
1
n
∑n
i=1EX
2
li.
It is easy to see that for l ∈ A
n∑
i=1
h(Yli|Qli) ≤
n∑
i=1
h(Yli) ≤
n
2
log 2pie
(
pl + µ
2
l
)
(73)
and
n∑
i=1
h(Yli|Qli) ≥
n∑
i=1
h(Yli|Xli) =
n
2
log 2pieµ2l (74)
Hence there exists 0 ≤ βl ≤ 1 such that
n∑
i=1
h(Yli|Qli) =
n
2
log 2pie(βlpl + µ
2
l ) (75)
Applying (75) to (72), we obtain
nR0 ≤
∑
l∈A
n
2
log
(
1 +
(1− βl)pl
βlpl + µ2l
)
+
∑
l∈Ac
n
2
log
(
1 +
pl
µ2l
)
+ nδ1 (76)
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We apply (66), follow the steps that are similar to those in (72), and obtain the following
bound
nR0 ≤
∑
l∈A
n
2
log 2pie
(
pl + ν
2
l
)
−
∑
l∈A
n∑
i=1
h(Zli|Qli) +
∑
l∈Ac
n
2
log
(
1 +
pl
ν2l
)
+ nδ2 (77)
For the second term in the preceding equation, we apply the entropy power inequality and
obtain
h(Zli|Qli = qli) = h(Yli + V
′
li|Qli = qli)
≥
1
2
log
(
22h(Yli|Qli=qli) + 22h(V
′
li
|Qli=qli)
)
=
1
2
log
(
22h(Yli|Qli=qli) + 2pie(ν2l − µ
2
l )
) (78)
Hence
n∑
i=1
h(Zli|Qli) ≥
1
2
n∑
i=1
E log
(
22h(Yli|Qli=qli) + 2pie(ν2l − µ
2
l )
)
(a)
≥
1
2
n∑
i=1
log
(
22Eh(Yli|Qli=qli) + 2pie(ν2l − µ
2
l )
)
=
1
2
n∑
i=1
log
(
22h(Yli|Qli) + 2pie(ν2l − µ
2
l )
)
(b)
≥
n
2
log
(
22
1
n
Pn
i=1 h(Yli|Qli) + 2pie(ν2l − µ
2
l )
)
(c)
=
n
2
log
(
2pie(βlpl + µ
2
l ) + 2pie(ν
2
l − µ
2
l )
)
=
n
2
log
(
2pie(βlpl + ν
2
l )
)
(79)
where (a) and (b) follow from Jensen’s inequality and the fact that log(2x + c) is a convex
function of x, and (c) follows from (75).
By applying (79) to (77), we obtain
nR0 ≤
∑
l∈A
n
2
log
(
1 +
(1− βl)pl
βlpl + ν2l
)
+
∑
l∈Ac
n
2
log
(
1 +
pl
ν2l
)
+ nδ2 (80)
We apply (67), follow the steps that are similar to those in (21), and obtain the following
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bound
nR1 ≤
∑
l∈A
n∑
i=1
[
I(Xli;Yli|Qli)− I(Xli;Zli|Qli)
]
+ n(δ1 + δ2)
=
∑
l∈A
n∑
i=1
[
h(Yli|Qli)− h(Yli|Xli;Qli)− h(Zli|Qli) + h(Zli|Xli;Qli)
]
+ n(δ1 + δ2)
≤
∑
l∈A
[
n
2
log
(
1 +
βlpl
µ2l
)
−
n
2
log
(
1 +
βlpl
ν2l
)]
+ n(δ1 + δ2)
(81)
where the last equality follows from (75) and (79).
For l ∈ A, we define pl0 = (1 − βl)pl and pl1 = βlpl. For l ∈ Ac, we define pl0 = pl. It is
clear from (23) that ∑
l∈A
[pl0 + pl1] +
∑
l∈Ac
pl0 ≤ P (82)
This concludes the proof of the converse.
C Proof of Theorem 3
We apply Lemma 2 and consider the following three cases. For each case, we apply the
technique in [8] to solve the optimization problem.
Case 1: We need to find p(1) ∈ P that maximizes γ0R01(p) + γ1R1(p). If p(1) satisfies
R01
(
p(1)
)
< R02
(
p(1)
)
, then the optimal p∗ = p(1).
The Lagrangian is given by
L =
∑
l∈A
[
γ0
2
log
(
1 +
pl0
µ2l + pl1
)
+
γ1
2
log
(
1 +
pl1
µ2l
)
−
γ1
2
log
(
1 +
pl1
ν2l
)]
+
∑
l∈Ac
γ0
2
log
(
1 +
pl0
µ2l
)
− λ
[∑
l∈A
[pl0 + pl1] +
∑
l∈Ac
pl0
] (83)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier.
For l ∈ Ac, p(1)l0 needs to maximize the following Ll
Ll =
γ0
2
log
(
1 +
pl0
µ2l
)
− λ pl0 =
∫ pl0
0
(
γ0
2 ln 2
1
µ2l + x
− λ
)
dx (84)
It is clear that p
(1)
l0 that optimizes Ll is either the root of the following equation
γ0
2 ln 2
1
µ2l + x
− λ = 0 (85)
41
if the root is positive or zero, i.e.,
p
(1)
l0 =
( γ0
2λ ln 2
− µ2l
)+
. (86)
For l ∈ A, p(1)l0 and p
(1)
l1 need to maximize the following Ll
Ll =
γ0
2
log
(
1 +
pl0
µ2l + pl1
)
+
γ1
2
log
(
1 +
pl1
µ2l
)
−
γ1
2
log
(
1 +
pl1
ν2l
)
− λ(pl0 + pl1)
=
∫ pl1+pl0
pl1
u
(1)
l0 (x)dx+
∫ pl1
0
u
(1)
l1 (x)dx
≤
∫ ∞
0
(
max
{
u
(1)
l0 (x), u
(1)
l1 (x)
})+
dx
(87)
where
u
(1)
l0 (x) =
γ0
2 ln 2
1
µ2l + x
− λ
u
(1)
l1 (x) =
γ1
2 ln 2
(
1
µ2l + x
−
1
ν2l + x
)
− λ
(88)
We next derive p
(1)
l0 and p
(1)
l0 that achieve the upper bound on Ll in (87) and hence maximize
Ll.
We define x
(1)
l0 to be the root of u
(1)
l0 (x) = 0 and x
(1)
l1 to be the largest root of u
(1)
l1 (x) = 0,
i.e.,
x
(1)
l0 =
γ0
2λ ln 2
− µ2l
x
(1)
l1 =
1
2
√
(ν2l − µ
2
l )
(
ν2l − µ
2
l +
2γ1
λ ln 2
)
−
1
2
(µ2l + ν
2
l ).
(89)
It can be seen that u
(1)
l0 (x) and u
(1)
l1 (x) intersect only once at
x
(1)
lr =
γ1
γ0
(ν2l − µ
2
l )− ν
2
l . (90)
In the following, we consider two cases.
(1) γ1
γ0
>
ν2
l
ν2
l
−µ2
l
, i.e., x
(1)
lr is positive.
It is easy to see that u
(1)
l1 (0) > u
(1)
l0 (0). The optimal p
(1)
l0 and p
(1)
l1 depend on the value of λ
and fall into the following three possibilities.
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Figure 12: Illustration of u
(1)
l0 (x) and u
(1)
l1 (x) for Case 1 with
γ1
γ0
>
ν2
l
ν2
l
−µ2
l
(a) If u
(1)
l1 (0) < 0 (see Fig. 12 (1)-(a)), i.e.,
γ1(ν2l −µ
2
l
)
2µ2
l
ν2
l
ln 2
< λ, then both u
(1)
l0 (x) and u
(1)
l1 (x) are
negative for x > 0. The upper bound on Ll in (87) is achieved by p
(1)
l0 = 0 and p
(1)
l1 = 0.
(b) If u
(1)
l1 (0) ≥ 0 and x
(1)
l0 < x
(1)
lr (see Fig. 12 (1)-(b)), i.e.,
γ2
0
2 ln 2(γ1−γ0)(ν2l −µ
2
l
)
< λ ≤
γ1(ν2l −µ
2
l
)
2µ2
l
ν2
l
ln 2
,
then the upper bound on Ll in (87) is achieved by p
(1)
l0 = 0 and p
(1)
l1 = x
(1)
l1 .
(c) If x
(1)
l0 ≥ x
(1)
lr (see Fig. 12 (1)-(c)), i.e., λ ≤
γ2
0
2 ln 2(γ1−γ0)(ν2l −µ
2
l
)
, then the upper bound on
Ll in (87) is achieved by p
(1)
l0 = x
(1)
l0 − x
(1)
lr and p
(1)
l1 = x
(1)
lr .
In summary, we obtain
p
(1)
l0 =
[
x
(1)
l0 − x
(1)
lr
]+
, p
(1)
l1 =
[
min
{
x
(1)
l1 , x
(1)
lr
}]+
. (91)
(2) γ1
γ0
≤
ν2
l
ν2
l
−µ2
l
, i.e., x
(1)
lr is zero or negative.
It is easy to see that u
(1)
0 (0) ≥ u
(1)
1 (0).
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(a) If u
(1)
l0 (0) ≤ 0, i.e.,
γ0
2µ2
l
ln 2
≤ λ (see Fig. 13 (2)-(a)), then the upper bound on Ll in (87)
is achieved by p
(1)
l0 = 0 and p
(1)
l1 = 0.
(b) If u
(1)
l0 (0) > 0, i.e., λ <
γ0
2µ2
l
ln 2
(see Fig. 13 (2)-(b)), the upper bound on Ll in (87) is
achieved by p
(1)
l0 = x
(1)
l0 and p
(1)
l1 = 0.
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Figure 13: Illustration of u
(1)
l0 (x) and u
(1)
l1 (x) for Case 1 with
γ1
γ0
≤
ν2
l
ν2
l
−µ2
l
In summary, we obtain
p
(1)
l0 =
[
x
(1)
l0
]+
, p
(1)
l1 = 0. (92)
The Lagrange parameter λ needs to be chosen to satisfy the power constraint
∑
l∈A
[pl0 + pl1] +
∑
l∈Ac
pl0 ≤ P. (93)
According to Lemma 2, if the condition R01
(
p(1)
)
< R02
(
p(1)
)
is satisfied, then the optimal
p∗ = p(1).
Case 2: We need to find p(2) ∈ P that maximizes γ0R02(p) + γ1R1(p). If p
(2) satisfies
R01
(
p(2)
)
> R02
(
p(2)
)
, then the optimal p∗ = p(2).
The Lagrangian is given by
L =
∑
l∈A
[
γ0
2
log
(
1 +
pl0
ν2l + pl1
)
+
γ1
2
log
(
1 +
pl1
µ2l
)
−
γ1
2
log
(
1 +
pl1
ν2l
)]
+
∑
l∈Ac
γ0
2
log
(
1 +
pl0
ν2l
)
− λ
[∑
l∈A
[pl0 + pl1] +
∑
l∈Ac
pl0
] (94)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier.
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For l ∈ Ac, it is easy to see that
p
(2)
l0 =
( γ0
2λ ln 2
− ν2l
)+
. (95)
For l ∈ A, p(2)l0 and p
(2)
l1 need to maximize the following Ll
Ll =
γ0
2
log
(
1 +
pl0
ν2l + pl1
)
+
γ1
2
log
(
1 +
pl1
µ2l
)
−
γ1
2
log
(
1 +
pl1
ν2l
)
− λ(pl0 + pl1)
=
∫ pl1+pl0
pl1
u
(2)
l0 (x)dx+
∫ pl1
0
u
(2)
l1 (x)dx
≤
∫ ∞
0
(
max
{
u
(2)
l0 (x), u
(2)
l1 (x)
})+
dx
(96)
where
u
(2)
l0 (x) =
γ0
2 ln 2
1
ν2l + x
− λ
u
(2)
l1 (x) =
γ1
2 ln 2
(
1
µ2l + x
−
1
ν2l + x
)
− λ
(97)
We define x
(2)
l0 to be the root of u
(2)
l0 (x) = 0 and x
(2)
l1 to be the root of u
(2)
l1 (x) = 0, i.e.,
x
(2)
l0 =
γ0
2λ ln 2
− ν2l
x
(2)
l1 =
1
2
√
(ν2l − µ
2
l )
(
ν2l − µ
2
l +
2γ1
λ ln 2
)
−
1
2
(µ2l + ν
2
l )
(98)
It is clear that u
(2)
l0 (x) and u
(2)
l1 (x) intersect only once at
x
(2)
lr =
γ1
γ0
(ν2l − µ
2
l )− µ
2
l (99)
Following steps similar to those in Case 1, we obtain the following p
(2)
l0 and p
(2)
l0 that achieve
the upper bound on Ll in (96) and hence maximize Ll.
(1) If γ1
γ0
>
µ2
l
ν2
l
−µ2
l
, i.e., x
(2)
lr is positive,
p
(2)
l0 =
[
x
(2)
l0 − x
(2)
lr
]+
, p
(2)
l1 =
[
min
{
x
(2)
l1 , x
(2)
lr
}]+
. (100)
(2) If γ1
γ0
≤
µ2
l
ν2
l
−µ2
l
, i.e., x
(2)
lr is zero or negative,
p
(2)
l0 =
[
x
(2)
l0
]+
, p
(2)
l1 = 0. (101)
The Lagrange parameter λ needs to be chosen to satisfy the power constraint. According
to Lemma 2, if the condition R01
(
p(2)
)
> R02
(
p(2)
)
is satisfied, then the optimal p∗ = p(2).
Case 3: We need to find p(α) ∈ P that maximizes γ0
(
αR01(p) + α¯R02(p)
)
+ γ1R1(p) for
a given 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. We then choose α to satisfy R01(p(α)) = R02(p(α)). According to Lemma
2, if we have not found the optimal p∗ in Cases 1 and 2, such an α must exist.
The Lagrangian is given by
L =
∑
l∈A
[
γ0α
2
log
(
1 +
pl0
µ2l + pl1
)
+
γ0α¯
2
log
(
1 +
pl0
ν2l + pl1
)
+
γ1
2
log
(
1 +
pl1
µ2l
)
−
γ1
2
log
(
1 +
pl1
ν2l
)]
+
∑
l∈Ac
[
γ0α
2
log
(
1 +
pl0
µ2l
)
+
γ0α¯
2
log
(
1 +
pl0
ν2l
)]
− λ
[∑
l∈A
[pl0 + pl1] +
∑
l∈Ac
pl0
]
(102)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier.
For l ∈ Ac, it is clear that p(α)l0 is either the root of the following equation
γ0α
2 ln 2
1
µ2l + x
+
γ0α¯
2 ln 2
1
ν2l + x
= λ (103)
if the root is positive, or zero. Hence p
(α)
l0 is given by
p
(α)
l0 =
(
1
2
√(
ν2l − µ
2
l −
γ0
2 ln 2λ
)2
+
2αγ0
λ ln 2
(ν2l − µ
2
l )−
1
2
(
µ2l + ν
2
l −
γ0
2 ln 2λ
))+
(104)
For l ∈ A, p(α)l0 and p
(α)
l1 need to maximize the following Ll
Ll =
γ0α
2
log
(
1 +
pl0
µ2l + pl1
)
+
γ0α¯
2
log
(
1 +
pl0
ν2l + pl1
)
+
γ1
2
log
(
1 +
pl1
µ2l
)
−
γ1
2
log
(
1 +
pl1
ν2l
)
− λ(pl0 + pl1)
=
∫ pl1+pl0
pl1
u
(α)
l0 (x)dx+
∫ pl1
0
u
(α)
l1 (x)dx
≤
∫ ∞
0
(
max
{
u
(α)
l0 (x), u
(α)
l1 (x)
})+
dx
(105)
where
u
(α)
l0 (x) =
γ0
2 ln 2
(
α
µ2l + x
+
α¯
ν2l + x
)
− λ
u
(α)
l1 (x) =
γ1
2 ln 2
(
1
µ2l + x
−
1
ν2l + x
)
− λ
(106)
46
We define x
(α)
l0 to be the largest root of u
(α)
l0 (x) = 0 and x
(α)
l1 to be the largest root of
u
(α)
l1 (x) = 0, i.e.,
x
(α)
l0 =
1
2
√(
ν2l − µ
2
l −
γ0
2 ln 2λ
)2
+
2αγ0
λ ln 2
(ν2l − µ
2
l )−
1
2
(
µ2l + ν
2
l −
γ0
2 ln 2λ
)
x
(α)
l1 =
1
2
√
(ν2l − µ
2
l )
(
ν2l − µ
2
l +
2γ1
λ ln 2
)
−
1
2
(µ2l + ν
2
l )
(107)
It is clear that u
(α)
l0 (x) and u
(α)
l1 (x) intersect only once at
x
(α)
lr =
γ1
γ0
(ν2l − µ
2
l )− (αν
2
l + α¯µ
2
l ) (108)
Following the similar steps to those in Case 1, we obtain
(1) If γ1
γ0
>
αν2
l
+α¯µ2
l
ν2
l
−µ2
l
, i.e., x
(α)
lr is positive,
p
(α)
l0 =
[
x
(α)
l0 − x
(α)
lr
]+
, p
(α)
l1 =
[
min
{
x
(α)
l1 , x
(α)
lr
}]+
. (109)
(2) If γ1
γ0
≤
αν2
l
+α¯µ2
l
ν2
l
−µ2
l
, i.e., x
(α)
lr is negative or zero,
p
(α)
l0 =
[
x
(α)
l0
]+
, p
(α)
l1 = 0. (110)
The Lagrange parameter λ needs to be chosen to satisfy the power constraint. We finally
choose α to satisfy R01
(
p(α)
)
= R02
(
p(α)
)
. Then p∗ = p(α).
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